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TENANTS' RIGHTS AND THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA MASTER METER ACT: A VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS
Sally Frank*
Frequently legislators are faced with a problem created by a void in the law. In
trying to remedy that problem, they sometimes inadvertently create a new one.
When the initial problem affects the rights of groups of people whose interests
differ, the corrective legislation can often unintentionally threaten due process
rights. This article explores one such instance when a legislature created a due
process violation in its attempt to address a serious tenant problem.
Many tenants live in buildings in which there is only one utility meter for the
entire building, known as master-metered buildings.' The utility bills of such
tenants are included in their rent, and it is their landlords' responsibility to pay the
bill. All too often, however, the landlord fails to do so. The typical response of the
utility company is to turn off the utilities. That action, however, punishes the
wrong party.
The District of Columbia Council faced this problem when it passed the Master
Meter Act (Act) in 1979.2 The Act seemed to create an equitable solution to the
problem of unpaid utility bills. It provides that when landlords of master-metered
buildings fail to pay utility bills, the utility company is required either to allow
tenants to be billed for the utilities in their own names8 or to sue the landlord for
the appointment of a receiver. The receiver collects the rent, pays the current
4
utility bills, and gives the remaining funds to the landlord after retaining a fee.
This article will examine the background of the Master Meter Acte and will
* Sally Frank is an Assistant Professor at Drake University Law School where she teaches at the Drake
Legal Clinic. Before coming to Drake, Professor Frank taught in the Housing Discrimination Clinic at New
York Law School and the Landlord Tenant Clinic at Antioch School of Law. Professor Frank would like to
acknowledge the assistance she received from Michael M;tcKcnzie, Catherine Engel, and Karcn A. W'alker,
law students, in the preparation of this article.
1. In 1979, there were "approximately 1,100 master-metered buildings in the District of Columbia that
[we]re [Potomac Electric and Power Company] PEPCO customers. These 1,100 buildings account[edi for
some 70,000 units." Testimony of Jesse Brown and John Derrick of PEPCO. District of Columbia Council,
Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs, Roundtable Discussion Concerning Bill 3-186 at 8
(October 4, 1979) [hereinafter Roundtable]. In May 1993, PEPCO estimated that the company's D.C.
customers included 1,593 master-metered buildings.
2. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-541 to -547 (1981).
3. Id. § 43-542.
4. Id. § 43-543.
5. Id. §§ 43-541 to -547.
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provide an outline of the structure of the District of Columbia's related landlord
and tenant laws. It will explain why tenants have a property interest in the money
that the Act places under the control of the receiver, including an interest in funds
the tenants have placed in the court's registry pursuant to a court order. The
article will then explain why the appointment of a trustee over tenant funds acts to
deprive tenants of their property, and how that deprivation threatens tenants'
rights to due process,6 particularly with regard to attachments. The article then
addresses how the Act as currently written fails to meet the requirements of due
process, and suggests amendments that would correct the Act's constitutional
deficiencies while maintaining its important functions.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE MASTER METER ACT

Before the passage of the Master Meter Act, utility companies were free to
terminate services in master-metered buildings when the landlord did not pay the
utility bills.7 The cut-off of services could occur regardless of whether the tenants
were paying their rent at the time. The District of Columbia Council recognized
that tenants suffer when utilities are terminated due to a landlord's failure to pay
the bills:
As a result of the termination of gas and electric services, tenants risk injury
to their health and safety. They suffer the lack of hot water to clean and cook;
loss of heat to keep warm and loss of electric lights, refrigerators and
elevators. The absence of such necessities of life results in unsafe and
unsanitary conditions, invites vandalism and robbery. In addition, some of the
consequences can be costly, such as spoilage of food and other property
damage.8
To prevent innocent tenants from losing essential services, the District
government often paid the utility bills that were owed and placed a tax lien for
that amount on the property.9 These payments cost the District approximately
$450,438 between 1975 and 197910 and led the District of Columbia Council to
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Roundtable, supra note 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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seek a less costly solution. The result was the Master Meter Act.
The recorded Council discussions surrounding the Act evidence no consideration
of the possibility that the tenants might purposely be withholding their rent from
the landlord. Rather, there is an assumption that the tenants are paying their rent
in the normal fashion.11 Frequently, however, a landlord that is not paying utility2
bills is also failing to maintain the property in compliance with the housing code.1
In such cases, tenants may be withholding their rent in an exercise of their rights
under the warranty of habitability, 1 ' which permits a tenant to withhold rent if
there are substantial housing code violations on the premises. A warranty of
habitability is implied by law in every lease and requires a landlord to maintain
14
In the District of Columbia, this standard is set out
the premises in fit condition.
15
code.
housing
in the
Tenants do not forfeit their warranty-of-habitability defenses when a utility
company exercises its rights under the Master Meter Act and a receiver is
appointed to collect the tenants' rent. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
has recognized that tenants may maintain those defenses in nonpayment suits
brought by receivers.1 6
Records of the Council's debate and hearings concerning the Master Meter Act
and the Act that appoints a receiver to be the trustee of rent that tenants have
withheld' 7 reveal no consideration by the Council of the possibility that tenants
have a right to those funds, by virtue of the warranty of habitability or other
defenses. Indeed, the only clear recognition by the D.C. Council that other
landlord tenant issues might be involved when the landlord does not pay its utility
bills was a provision preserving tenants' other remedies. That provision states:

11. See id.
12. See e.g., Shannon & Luchs v. Tollentino, L&T No. 50940-85; 1736 18th Street N.W. Ltd.
Partnership v. Saleem, L&T No. 26204-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1987) consolidated with Washington
Gas Light Co. v. 1736 18th Street N.W. Ltd. Partnership, L&T No. 9919-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25.
1987).
13. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14, § 302.2 (1991). See also Javins v. First National Realty Corp. 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (landlord's breach of implied warranty of habitability found to be grounds for partial
suspension of tenant's rental obligation).
14. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1083.
15. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14, §§ 301-899 (1991). See also Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten,
361 A.2d 187, 189 (D.C. 1976) (only those violations of the housing code %hich substantially affect
habitability are violations of the warranty of habitability).
16. Shannon & Luchs v. Jeter, 469 A.2d 812 (D.C. 1983).
17. D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-543(a)(4) (1981). The statute nowhere defines the receiver's responsibilities
to tenant as trustee of tenant funds.
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Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prevent the tenant of such
apartment house from pursuing any other action or remedy at law or equity
that it may have against the owner, agent, lessor, manager, or company.1 8
By curtailing the tenants' ability to raise the warranty of habitability defense, the
Council created the constitutional problem that is the subject of this article.

II.

DEPRIVATION OF TENANT PROPERTY INTEREsT

Ordinarily, when tenants in the District of Columbia withhold rent from their
landlord, they maintain a property interest in the funds they have withheld until a
court determines how much, if any, rent they owe.19 Before a court makes that
determination, the tenants have the right to raise any relevant defenses to the
landlord's claims, including those arising under the warranty of habitability.2 0
Appointing a receiver to be trustee of those withheld funds deprives the tenants of
a property interest in the use and control of their money.
The court may appoint a receiver pursuant to Section 43-543(a)(4) of the
Master Meter Act, which states, in part:
Upon order of the Court, the receiver shall become
trustee of any escrow accounts or other funds
established by the tenants or otherwise into which
rents or payments for use and occupancy have been paid
or are being held. 2 '
This section of the Act gives the receiver the right, with a court order, to take
control over tenant funds.22 Any tenant funds could be encompassed by the
section, which is not further explained in the legislative history. 23 Moreover,
although the statute required the Public Service Commission to adopt regulations
for the implementation of the Act,2 4 the regulations adopted in 1981 do not

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. § 43-545.
Jeter, 469 A.2d at 816.
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1082. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-543(a)(4) (1981).
Id.
See Roundtable, supra note 1, at 5-6.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-547 (1981).
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address the section of the Act which this article analyzes.26
Because there is no explanation in any legislative or regulatory sources as to the
meaning and intended method of implementation of the provision that permits the
receiver to become trustee of tenant funds,26 Section 43-543(a)(4) could place a
dramatic burden on tenants' rights.2" For example, any rent that a tenant
withholds and puts in the bank could fall under the rubric of this clause, even if
the rent is mixed with other funds. The Act theoretically permits a receiverappointed trustee of tenant funds to take control of the money, withdraw it from
the bank, and use it to pay the outstanding utility bill without any consideration of
28
the tenants' rights.
While a narrower view of the statute's reach is possible, such a view would
ignore portions of the law and their implications. For instance, one could argue
that only escrowed funds are at risk. Once the escrowed funds are set aside, the
landlord might attempt to lay claim to the funds. This approach, however, ignores
the phrase in the statute that permits the appointment of the receiver-trustee over
"other funds established by the tenants or otherwise. "2
One might also try to limit the reach of the statute by arguing that Section 43543(a)(4) applies only when there are no housing code violations and thus no
defenses to the claim for rent. This view presents at least two difficulties. First, the
Act contains no such explicit limitations. Second, the Act does not specify who
would determine the existence of housing code violations and whether they had
25. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 15, §§ 400-499 (1991).
26. The D.C. Council based the Master Meter Act on a similar law in another jurisdiction. See
Roundtable, supra note 1, at 6. The Connecticut law does not, however, contain a clause similar to the one at
issue in this article. See CONN.GEM. STAT. §§ 16-262(c)-(i)(1988).
27. In one such case, a landlord that owned apartments with unacceptable conditions, such as no heat or
hot water, falling floors, and ceilings, tried to use the receivership proceedings to obtain funds the tenants had
withheld but saved. The receiver was appointed trustee of the tenant funds and sought to obtain funds the
tenants had paid into the court registry. The tenants expended the funds they had saved before they had
actual notice that the receiver was appointed trustee of their funds, thus preventing the receiver from
obtaining their money. Eventually, a jury awarded large abatements to the tenants, which permitted them to
obtain partial refunds of the money in the court registry. If they had not expended their bank funds, the
receiver would have obtained money that the jury later determined the tenants did not owe. It is doubtful that
the tenants could have then recovered their money. See 1736 18th Street N.W. Ltd. Partnership v. Saleem.
L&T No. 26204-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1987) consolidated with Washington Gas Light Co. v. 1736
18th Street N.W. Ltd. Partnership, L&T No. 9919-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1987).
28. For example, the D.C. Superior Court ruled in one case that a receiver was entitled to rent funds
deposited into the bank account of a tenants' association, and that the tenants could not raise Jmins defenses
against the receiver. Washington Light Company v. Continental Management Company. 110 Daily Wash. L
Rep. 2349, 2355 (Sept. 27, 1982).
29. D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-543(a)(4) (1981).
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been cured. The determination cannot be left up to the receiver. Rather, an
independent official should adjudicate the issues.30 To ascertain housing code
violations, a judge who orders the receivership may hold a hearing on the question
before entering the order making the receiver trustee of tenant funds. Because the
tenants are not parties to the receivership proceeding, that hearing alone could not
protect the tenants' interests. 3 1 (Section IV, infra at 138, discusses ways of
conducting hearings within the receivership proceedings to remedy the
constitutional infirmity identified in this article.)
A. Tenants' Legally Cognizable Property Interest in Withheld Rent and/or
Rent in Escrow
Tenants often save the rent they withhold to ensure the availability of any
money a court may later determine is owed to the landlord. In the District of
Columbia, courts routinely impose protective orders that require tenants to pay
their prospective rent into the registry of the court.3 2 Whether or not withheld rent
is paid into the court registry, the tenant retains a property interest in the money
until a court determines how much, if any, rent the tenant owes, after the court
33
hears the tenant's defenses to the nonpayment of rent.
It is possible, if unlikely, that the Master Meter Act could be construed to give
the receiver control over not only money in an escrow account, but any other
money held by the tenant. In the District of Columbia, tenants are not required to
place their withheld rent money in an escrow account in order to defend
themselves in the event of a landlord-tenant proceeding. Only after they are sued
and a protective order is issued are tenants required to place prospective rents in
the court's registry. a4 Rent claimed due before the suit was filed need not be
35
produced until after a court determines the merits.
The courts have authorized the imposition of protective orders to safeguard the
landlord's interest during the sometimes protracted litigation in a nonpayment
30. While a housing inspector can issue a report identifying violations that may exist at a given time,
such a report will not suffice to determine if there were prior violations and whether the landlord had prior
notice. A full hearing is necessary to determine these issues.
31. This assumes that the tenants are not made parties to the proceeding. While the court rules permit
the tenants to be joined to the proceedings, such joinder is not required.
32. See Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Dameron v. Capitol House
Associates Ltd., 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981); McNeal v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508 (D.C. 1975).
33. Shannon &. Luchs v. Jeter, 469 A.2d 812, 816 (D.C. 1983).
34. Bell, 430 F.2d at 483.
35. Id.
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proceeding."8 This is accomplished by requiring the tenant to "meet current rental
payments during the litigation period, .

.

. an obligation which [the tenant]

voluntarily assumed at an earlier date when [the tenant] entered into the lease."3 7
The funds in the protective order are not, however, the property of the landlord.
In Dameron v. Capitol House Associates, Ltd., the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals emphasized the limitations of protective orders by stating that "a
protective order entered by the trial judge is valid only if it is a legitimate exercise
of the court's equity power as contemplated by Bell and effects no permanent
disposition of property to the prejudice of parties." 38 Accordingly, the court held
that funds could not be released from the court registry before trial unless "the
tenant's ultimate liability to pay is crystal clear and the landlord's immediate need
is extreme." 39
When tenants are sued for nonpayment of rent, defenses exist even if the tenants
did not, in fact, pay their rent. One substantive defense tenants have is a claim
that the conditions in their apartments violate the warranty of habitability as
established in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.'0 Tenants inform the court of
their Javins defense in their answer to the nonpayment suit.' 1
In Washington Gas Light v. Continental Management Co.,'" the D.C. Superior
Court ruled that Section 43-543(a)(4) of the Master Meter Act does not permit
consideration of the tenants' warranty of habitability claims when the court orders
the transfer of tenant property to the control of the receiver.' 3 Shortly after that
ruling, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled in Shannon & Luchs v. Jeter that tenants
retain those defenses if the receiver sues them for nonpayment of rent. 4 The
receiver must, therefore, join the landlord as a party to the case so the tenants can
litigate their defenses.
Jeter calls into question the continued viability of the ruling in Continental
Management Company. 5 The two cases can only be reconciled by a finding that
the tenants retain their defenses to claims of nonpayment of rent if the receiver is
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
for both.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 482.
Id.
431 A.2d 580, 584 (D.C. 1981).
Id. at 585.
428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
While theoretically a landlord-tenant proceeding is for possession and not rent owed, in practice it is
Tenants cannot retain possession without paying the amount of rent the court determines they owe.
110 Wash. Law Rep. 2349 (Sept. 27, 1982).
Id. at 2355.
469 A.2d 812, 816 (D.C. 1983); See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-545.
110 Wash. Law Rep. 2349, 2355 (Sept. 27. 1982).
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not appointed trustee of the tenants' funds." In that case, there would be a
receiver but no trustee. Such a result would make little sense. If tenants maintain
their defenses when sued, those defenses extend to claims for past-due rent even if
the tenants have saved those funds. A more reasonable reading of the ruling of the
D.C. Court of Appeals is that the tenants maintain their defenses even when a
receiver seeks appointment as trustee of tenant funds.
When a tenant raises a Javins defense in a nonpayment-of-rent proceeding
brought by a receiver and a landlord, a jury may award an abatement of rent even
if it means that the receiver does not collect enough rent to pay the total utility
bill. 47 To remain in possession of the rental unit, the tenant is required to pay only
what the court determines is owed. Additionally, the receiver "would not be
authorized to present and advocate opposition to a Javins defense."' 48 Only the
landlord may take that position.
To allow the receiver to take control of tenant funds without a nonpayment
proceeding or other hearing to determine any rent that may be due is to allow the
receiver to ignore the tenants' rights. Section 43-543(a)(4) of the Act encourages
receivers to seek appointment as trustee of tenant funds and then to use those
funds to pay the utility bills instead of bringing nonpayment proceedings. 4" This
process favors the receiver over the tenants, because it allows the receiver to obtain
the tenants' money without a hearing or an opportunity for the tenants to raise a
claim to the funds. The procedure is also weighted in favor of the landlord,
because "[a]ny monies remaining after such payments [to the utility company],
fees and costs shall be turned over to the owner, agent, lessor, or manager."'00
In 1969 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected
such schemes in Dorfmann v. Boozer.5 The original dispute in that case began
when the tenants withheld rent and put sums equal to their rent into a bank
account.5 2 The landlord, claiming that it was on the verge of bankruptcy, brought
suit in federal court against the tenants. It sought an accounting and an injunction
to require the tenants to deliver funds deposited in a bank to the court for possible

46. Because the former decision is a Superior Court decision, while the latter is a decision by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, there really is no need to reconcile the two. If they are in conflict, the
Jeter decision would control.
47. See Jeter, 469 A.2d 812.
48. Id. at 817.
49. D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-543(a)(4).
50. Id.
51. 414 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
52. Id.
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release to the landlord. The district court had granted the requested relief, and the
tenants appealed. 53
The circuit court reversed the injunction. In Dorfmann, the court addressed the
ways in which the landlord had undercut the District of Columbia's careful
balancing of landlord and tenant rights, reflected in the statutory framework for
nonpayment suits:
The struggle here between the rent strikers and the landlord involves a variety
of closely balanced legal and tactical approaches; the preliminary injunction
quickly and unwarrantedly destroyed that balance. The landlord's remedy at
law is obvious and adequate."
The same, of course, can be said of the receiver's remedies absent an order
appointing the receiver as trustee of the tenants' funds.
In rejecting the landlord's argument, the circuit court found that the money in
the bank was not rent that belonged to the landlord, but rather funds that
belonged to the tenants. 5 The court impliedly noted the due process problems
inherent in giving the money to the landlord, ruling that the landlord sought to
undercut the statutory provision limiting attachment or garnishment prior to
judgment. In Dorfmann, the court reasoned that the landlord treated the funds
deposited by tenants "as a res.... bring[ing] the fund within the court and ...
impress[ing] a constructive trust on the fund; and [by] ...obtain[ing], without a
bond, not just pretrial attachment of appellants' money but the potential use of
that money as well." 5 The Master Meter Act operates in the same manner by
giving control and use of tenants' funds to the trustee and receiver without a bond.
The central issue in many trials for nonpayment of rent is the unsafe and
unsanitary conditions that often exist in the apartments of tenants whose buildings
become subject to receivership orders. When those conditions are present, a judge
or jury may award substantial abatements to the tenants.57 Until such a
determination is made, the tenants retain a property interest in the unpaid rent.
Once a judicial determination is made, however, the tenants maintain a property
interest only in the money not owed to the landlord.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 1170-71.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Javins, 428 F.2d 1071, 1082.
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B. Appointment of a Receiver and Deprivation of Tenant Property
When a receiver is appointed trustee of tenant funds, the receiver takes control
of those funds. Such a measure deprives the tenants of full use and control of their
assets and places doubt on their entitlement to these assets. In this way,
appointment of a receiver deprives tenants of a property right without due process.
The law does not specify what the receiver's duties are with respect to the tenant
funds over which the receiver is appointed trustee. No regulation or legislative
history describes those duties. The Act defines the responsibilities of the receiver as
follows: "The receiver shall pay the utility company from such rents and payments
for utility services provided by such company on and after the date of his
appointment.... Any monies remaining after such payments, fees and costs shall
be turned over to the owner, lessor, or manager.' 58
One reading of the statute is that the receiver's duty, as trustee, is merely to
hold the funds until the court determines their proper disposition. The Act,
however, contains no guidelines as to how a court should determine the distribution
of the funds. A court or receiver might well understand the Act to mean that
sufficient funds should be turned over to the utility to pay the outstanding utility
bills accumulated after the appointment of the receiver. The remaining money
might then be paid to the landlord. Alternatively, the receiver might adopt this
procedure on its own.
In one case, the receiver took the latter position. He argued for the release of
funds paid into the court registry pursuant to a protective order after the initiation
of nonpayment proceedings:
Well, as I said, the first thing he's certain to do is apply them to the gas bills
that have accrued since December 4, your honor ....
[H]e would . . . I suppose, deduct his management fee and then he would

calculate what the usages in the building [sic] or have Washington Gas
calculate that. And then take those monies and apply them by paying them
directly to Washington Gas. 59
In a second hearing on the same case, the receiver's lawyer, arguing the same
set of motions, expanded on that point: "The receiver's duties are very carefully

58. D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-543(a)(4) (1981).
59. Transcript of hearing, 1736 18th Street N.W. Ltd. Partnership v. Saleem, L&T No. 26204-86
(D.C. Super. Ct., February 25, 1987) at 8-9.
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circumscribed by the statute. They are to pay the current gas bill, to apply it to
the receiver's fees as they're defined in the order and then to return them to the
owner." 60 If such an interpretation were accepted, it could permanently deprive
tenants of their property.
In 1736 18th Street NW Ltd Partnershipv. Saleet," 1 the receiver retained a
new lawyer who argued that the utility company would have no responsibility to
repay the tenants if the court later determined that the tenants had owed no
money to the landlord or the utility company. The tenants' only resort, if they were
not parties to the proceedings in the first place, would be to sue the landlord,
whether or not the landlord received any of the tenants' funds.02 Finally, the
tenants could not sue the receiver for repayment of their funds used to pay bills
they did not owe, because, as the D.C. Court of Appeals later confirmed in Capitol
Terrace Inc. v. Shannon & Luchs, Inc.,6" as an officer of the court a receiver
enjoys judicial immunity from suit."'
In 1736 18th Street, the tenants' counsel raised constitutional objections to the
receivership order, and a second attorney for receiver presented the court with
another interpretation of the duties of the receiver. The new attorney modified the
previous argument by stating that the receiver would not release the money to the
utility company without a court order. 5 He admitted, however, that the statute
did not give a clear indication whether such an order would be required.c The
ruling of the judge who heard this argument did not resolve the question of how
the receiver was required to treat the money once it was collected.07 Whether the
receiver automatically turns the money over to the landlord or merely holds it until
a later court determination of who should receive it, tenants are nevertheless
deprived of the right to their property if they are not given an opportunity to

60. Transcript of hearing, 1736 18th St. N.W. (L&T No. 26204-86) at 9 (D.C. Supzr. CI Mar. 2.
1987).
61. L&T No. 25204-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1987).
62. Transcript of hearing, 1736 18th St. N.W. (L&T No. 26204-86) at 33 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 8.
1987).
63. 564 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1989).
64. Id. at 51-53.
65. Transcript of hearing, 1736 18th St. N.W. (L&T No. 26204-86) at 34 (D.C. Super. C1. Apr. 8,
1987); Transcript of hearing, 1736 18th Street N.W. (L&T No. 26204-86) at 19 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25,
1987).
66. Transcript of hearing, 1736 18th Street N.W. (L&T No. 26204-86) at 19 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug.
25, 1987).
67. The judge upheld the receiver's right to be appointed trustee of tenant funds in the ca-e. The
decision was appealed, but the case became moot before the court of appeals was able to rule on the issue.
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protect that right. 68
In Connecticut v. Doehr,69 a 1991 attachment case, the Supreme Court found
that a mere lien on property affected property interests significantly enough to
require due process considerations. The Court wrote in Doehr that "even the
temporary or partial impairments to property rights that attachments, liens, and
similar encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due process protection. Without
doubt, state procedures for creating and enforcing attachments, as with liens, 'are
subject to the strictures of due process.' ,,70
Likewise, a trusteeship order under the Master Meter Act serves to deprive
tenants of the exclusive use and enjoyment of their money. A short period of
deprivation does not in itself serve to diminish the tenants' rights to due process:
Any significant taking of property by the State is within the purview of the
Due Process Clause. While the length and consequent severity of a
deprivation may be anotherfactor to weigh in determining the appropriate
form of hearing, it is not decisive of the basic right to a prior hearing of some
71
kind.
Because tenants may have defenses to raise when sued for nonpayment of rent,
they maintain a property interest in any money they withhold from their landlord
until a court determines how much rent they owe, if any. So long as they maintain
that interest, even a temporary loss of control of their property represents a
deprivation of the right to their property and gives rise to constitutional violations.
III. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of...

property, without due process of law." 17 2 The provisions of the Fifth Amendment
apply to the District of Columbia." The terms of the Fifth Amendment include
68. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained in Reed v. Village of Shorewood,
"'[D]eprive' in the due process clause cannot just mean 'destroy'. If the state prevents you from entering your
house it deprives you of your property right even if the fee simple remains securely yours. A property right is
not bare title, but the right of exclusive use and enjoyment." 704 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 1983).
69. U.S. 1I1S.Ct. 2105 (1991).
70. Id. at 2113 (citations omitted). See also Reardon v. U.S., 947 F.2d 1509, 1518 (1st Cir. 1991).
71. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972) (emphasis added).

V.

72.

U.S. CONsT. amend.

73.

Kendrick v. United States, 238 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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the concepts of both procedural and substantive due process.74
The problem that the Act creates is one of procedural due process. To survive
constitutional challenges based on procedural due process, statutes that may result
in a deprivation of property generally must at least provide for a bond and a
hearing to determine whether the person with an interest in the property owes
anything to the plaintiff.7 5 The original possessor of the property must also be a
party to the case before another individual may take possession.70
The United States Supreme Court has set forth the required analysis when
procedural due process is at issue. "At the outset ....we are faced with what has

become a familiar two-part inquiry: we must determine whether ...[a party] was
deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process was [the party's] due."77
Tenants have a property interest in any money over which a receiver may be
named trustee. Thus, the challenged portion of Section 43-543(a)(4) of the Act
should be analyzed in terms of the procedural safeguards afforded by the statute,
keeping in mind that
"'[d]ue process', unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Cafeteria Workers
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). "Due process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).78

A. ProceduralDue Process in Attachment Cases
Attachment has been defined as
[A] proceeding, the object of which is to hold property to abide the order of
the court for the payment of a judgment in the event a debt shall be
established.... In this meaning, the term is used to describe a security given
by law to a plaintiff for the purpose of satisfying such judgment or decree as
74. See Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980); Miller v. Rumsfcld. 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
75. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). See also Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
481 U.S. 252 (1987).
76. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-762 (1989) (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40
(1940)).
77. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 US. 422, 428 (1982). See also Brock v. Roadway Expres
Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987).
78. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
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he may obtain. It is procedural in its character and a remedy or a part of a
remedy for the collection of a debt. It is tantamount to an involuntary
dispossession of the defendant prior to any adjudication of the rights of the
plaintiff. . ..
When tenants withhold rent, the Master Meter Act presumes that the utility
and landlord are owed a debt. Thus, a receiver is appointed to collect that debt on
behalf of the landlord and the utility company. From the tenant funds it controls,
the receiver pays the utility bill, a fee to itself, and the remainder to the landlord.
There is no adjudication of the rights of landlord or tenant at the time the receiver
is appointed trustee of tenant funds. The only parties to the proceeding are the
utility company and the landlord; the tenants are not present.
In several rulings on attachments and other provisional remedies, the Supreme
Court has established the constitutional requirements for a statute creating such a
remedy. Those procedures include some form of judicial involvement,8 a bond
from the party seeking the attachment, 8 a hearing before or shortly after the
attachment to give the other party an opportunity to contest it,82 an affidavit
setting forth the grounds for the attachment in some detail, including the movant's
84
3
right to the goods,8 and notice.
Because attachment is a "harsh and drastic remedy," 85 the Supreme Court has
examined various state attachment and garnishment procedures to determine
whether they comport with the requirements of due process. In Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corporation of Bay View, 8 the Supreme Court ruled that

Wisconsin's prejudgment garnishment statute was unconstitutional. That statute
provided no pre-garnishment hearing or notice and allowed the clerk of the court,
instead of a judge, to issue the garnishment order.87 The Supreme Court expanded
Sniadach in Fuentes v. Shevin. 8 There, the Court ruled that the Pennsylvania and
79. 7 C.J.S. Attachment § 2 (1980). See also 6 Am.JUR. 2D Attachment and Garnishment§ 1 (1963);
Frank F. Fasi Supply Co. v. Wigwam Investment Co., 308 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D. Haw. 1969).
80. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616 (1974).
81. Id. at 606.
82. Id. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972).
83. Id. See also North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 602 (1975).
84. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80; Mitchell, 416 U.S. 600,
85. Jack Development, Inc. v. Howard Eales, Inc., 388 A.2d 466, 468 (D.C. 1978) (quoting Rieffer v.
Home Indemnity Co., 61 A.2d 26, 27 (D.C. 1948)).
86. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
87. Id.
88. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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Florida replevin statutes were unconstitutional, because they authorized a clerk to
issue a replevin writ solely on the application of the person claiming the property,
without a notice or hearing.8" In dicta, however, the Court implied that a narrowly
drawn statute allowing seizure prior to a hearing might be constitutional, if there
were a claim that the debtor was about to destroy or remove the property. 0
In its next garnishment case, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,01 the Supreme Court
upheld such a sequestration statute. The Louisiana law challenged in that case
required a specific affidavit detailing the claimant's right to the property, an ex
parte application to a judge, a bond to protect the other party against all damages,
and a post-seizure opportunity for a hearing within five days.02 The entity seeking
the sequestration order was also required to obtain a lien for the property.0 3 If the
creditor did not prove the grounds for the order, the court could assess the creditor
damages and attorneys' fees." The Court noted that "[tihe usual rule has been
'[where only property rights are involved], mere postponement of the judicial
enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for ultimate
judicial determinationof liability is adequate.'"" Thus, the Court found that the
Louisiana sequestration statute included sufficient protections for the alleged
debtor to meet the requirements of due process.00
In North Georgia FinishingCo. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,o however, the Supreme Court
found that a Georgia garnishment statute did not satisfy procedural due process
requirements. The Georgia statute allowed a creditor to file a perfunctory affidavit
in support of garnishment with a court clerk,03 and the affidavit was not required

89. Id. at 69-70.
90. Id. at 93.
91. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
92. Id. at 605-7. The Supreme Court later debated whether a bond is alwa s required in a prejudgment
attachment in Connecticut v. Doehr, U.S. .
111 S.Ct. 2105 (1991). While the majority did not
reach the issue, four Justices in a concurring opinion cited North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem. 419 U.S.
601, at 610-11 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) and Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.. 416 U.S. at 606 n.8, in
support of their conclusion that bonds were required by due process. Dothr, U.S. I l l S.Ct. at
2116-17.
93. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 605-6.
94. Id. at 606.
95. Id. at 611 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). According to the Supreme Court. "nearly every
state requires either a preattachment hearing, a showing of some exigent circumstances, or both. b-forc
permitting an attachment to take place". Connecticut v. Doehr, U.S. I I S.Ct. at 2116.
96. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 618-19.
97. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
98. Id. at 602.
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to be based on personal knowledge. 99 The statute required the filing of a bond by
the creditor,100 but the debtor was not afforded an opportunity to contest the
validity of the order, either before or shortly after it was issued. The garnishor was
never required to prove its entitlement to the order. The Supreme Court held that
the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the debtor's right to due
process.' 1
A more recent opinion on prejudgment attachment came in the 1991 case of
Connecticut v. Doehr.10 2 In that case, the Supreme Court found the Connecticut
attachment statute unconstitutional. Under the Connecticut statute, a plaintiff
could file an affidavit stating a claim to the money in conclusory fashion and have
a judge order a lien on the property.10 3 The defendant had a right to a hearing in
which he or she could claim that there was no probable cause; could request the
attachment be vacated, modified, or a bond substituted; or could claim an
exemption for all or part of the property.' 04 No bond was required.' 0
Furthermore, no exigent circumstances needed to be shown to effect the procedure
without notice before the lien was placed. 0
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized many of these
Supreme Court rulings in making its determination that a Pennsylvania foreign
attachment statute was unconstitutional:
We infer from the current crop of Supreme Court decisions that the
prevailing rule of procedural due process is that official seizures can be
constitutionally accomplished only with either "notice and ... opportunity for
a hearing or other safeguard against mistaken" taking .... The "overriding

consideration must be whether the statute minimizes the risk that the ex parte
issuance of a writ will result in a wrongful or arbitrary deprivation consistent
with the protection of legitimate creditor's remedies ....

7

As written, the section of the Master Meter Act that makes the receiver the
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
(citations

Id. at 607.
Id.
Id. at 608.
U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2105 (1991).
Id. at 2110.
Id.
Id. at 2116.
Id. at 2111.
Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank of the City of New York, 530 F.2d 1123, 1128-9 (3d Cir. 1976)
omitted) (footnote omitted).
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trustee of tenant funds does not meet the requirements set forth by the Supreme
Court. Neither the utility company nor the receiver is required to submit an
affidavit showing that the tenants actually owe the funds in question. Nor are they
required to affirm that the property is in compliance with the D.C. housing code or
that the tenants have no defense to a nonpayment action. The receiver is not
required to allege that any emergency exists to justify eliminating pre-seizure
notice and a hearing. There is no post-seizure hearing. No bond is required to be
placed by the utility company. Moreover, the utility company may claim the right
to keep the money the receiver has already seized, even if a court later determines
after a trial for nonpayment of rent that the tenants did not owe that money.1 03
Perhaps most importantly, the Act contains no procedure before or after the
seizure to determine whether the tenants owe the money in question. The receiver
is not required to initiate a nonpayment proceeding, and the tenants are not parties
to the receivership proceeding. Furthermore, the Act does not require that the
tenants receive notice of the means by which they may challenge the seizure.'00
Thus, there are no procedures in the Act to minimize the risk that the order "will
result in a wrongful ...

deprivation."' 10

As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in upholding federal
maritime attachment procedures, "[tihe [Supreme] Court has held that where no
pre-attachment notice and hearing are afforded, an immediate and adequate postattachment hearing is constitutionally mandated.""' The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit similarly found that the key factor in upholding a provisional remedy
was "the apparent availability of prompt judicial determination of the debtor's
claim of exemption." ' 2 Thus, attachments must provide either a pre-seizure
hearing or a prompt post-seizure hearing to allow the party whose property is
being taken to challenge the seizure.
The Master Meter Act does not provide an immediate post-attachment hearing.
In one case, the receivership order was signed in December 1986, but no hearing
was held on the tenants' claims of warranty-of-habitability defenses until March
1988, when nonpayment proceedings were adjudicated in a jury trial. 1 3 In the
108. See transcript of hearing, 1736 18th Street. N.M. (L&T No. 26204-86) at 33 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Apr. 8, 1987).
109. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-541 to -547 (1981).
110. Jonnet, 530 F.2d at 1128-29.
111. Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 640 (9th Cir. 1982).
112. Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp. of Duval, 539 F.2d 1355, 1368 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Finbzrg v.
Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 59 (3d Cir. 1980).
113. Washington Gas Light Co. v. 1736 18th Street N.W. Ltd. Partnership, and cases consolidated with
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interim, the tenants pressed vigorously for a trial to have their warranty-ofhabitability claims heard. No other hearing was held during that time to
determine whether the funds to be seized were actually owed to the landlord or the
receiver.
In the same case, three tenants affected by the receivership order were not
parties to the receivership proceeding until April 1987. They were thus subjected
to a lengthy wait before a court heard their warranty-of-habitability claims. This
case demonstrates the potential consequences, to tenants under the Master Meter
Act, when the receiver chooses not to bring a nonpayment suit. 1 4 Section 43543(a)(4) of the Master Meter Act is unconstitutional because it permits a
receiver to be trustee of tenant funds and to take control of those funds without
meeting the procedural due process requirements mandated by the Supreme Court
for provisional remedies involving seizures.
B. ProceduralDue Process In Nonattachment Cases
At a minimum, procedural due process requires notice that is reasonably
calculated to inform affected individuals of the pendency of an action, the means
of correcting any errors,"25 and a hearing before or immediately after the
attempted deprivation." 6 These procedures are easily provided in cases in which a
receiver is to be appointed trustee of tenants' funds, but the Act does not authorize
them. Without such procedures, there is a strong likelihood that tenants will lose
their funds to the receiver even when they owe no money.
In Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft,"17 the Supreme Court found
that a utility company's deficiency notice violated due process requirements. In
that case, the utility issued a warning to the customer indicating that the utilities
would be cut off if money were due, but did not tell the customer how to challenge

it, L&T No. 9919-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1987).
114. This case was unusual in that, although a receiver was named trustee of tenant funds, it never
gained control of the accounts. Although the tenants had saved their rent, those funds had been expended
before the tenants had notice that the order naming the receiver trustee of their money had been entered. In
most cases, tenants cannot count on such an occurrence.
115. Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978).
116. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979). In Propert v. District of Columbia, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a District of Columbia statute providing for the removal and
destruction of abandoned cars violated due process requirements "[b]ecause D.C.'s policy alled] to provide
either adequate notice or a hearing of any kind .... " 948 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
117. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
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the bill.11 To have met due process requirements, the notice should have informed
the customer of the procedure by which it could challenge the bill.110 According to
the Court, "[tihe purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the
affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending
'hearing.'

"120

The first requisite step in due process, therefore, is notice. As the Supreme
Court has repeatedly reiterated,
[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice, reasonably calculated,
under all of the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections .... The
notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information ....

21

Under the Master Meter Act, tenants are not served with pre-hearing notice.
Some, however, may receive actual notice of a proceeding between the landlord
and the utility company, because a notice must be posted in the building and
directed to the landlord. 22 Because tenants are not parties, the notice does not
apprise them of any involvement they could have in the receivership proceedings.
After the receivership order is signed, it may be served on at least some of the
tenants. Such notice is not, however, "reasonably calculated ...

[to] afford them

an opportunity to present their objections," 12 because as non-parties the tenants
do not have standing to object.
The typical order served on tenants in these cases gives them neither a way of
challenging the appointment of the receiver as the trustee of their funds, nor a
means of challenging the allegation that they owe the money. Furthermore, that
124
allegation can be made without an affidavit.
118. Memphis Light. 436 U.S. at 14.
119. Id. at 14-15.
120. Id.

121. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations omitted)
(notice by publication of hearing for approval of an accounting where addresses of interested parties are

available violates due process); Armstrong v. Manzo. 380 US. 545. 550 (1965) (termination of a fathres
parental rights without pretermination notice violates due process). See also Ford v. Turner. 531 A.2d 233
(D.C. 1987); Brock v. Roadway Express, 481 U.S. 252, 264 (1987).
122. D.C. CoDa ANN. § 43-543(a)(2) (1981).
123. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
124. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-541 to -547.
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In failing to require that tenants be named as parties to receivership cases, the
Act virtually ensures that the notice will be insufficient to permit the tenants to
exercise their rights. Moreover, the statute seeks to bind the tenants to an order
depriving them of their funds without simultaneously making the tenants parties to
the proceeding. 12 5 The Supreme Court has reiterated its earlier holding that, "'one
is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which [one] is not
designated a party or to which [one] has not been made a party by service of
process.' "126
In addition to failing to require sufficient notice or to name tenants as parties,
the Master Meter Act also fails to require a hearing. The Supreme Court noted:
As our decisions have emphasized time and again, the Due Process Clause
grants the aggrieved party the opportunity to present [a] case and have its
merits fairly judged. Thus it has become a truism that "some form of
hearing" is required before the owner is finally deprived of a protected
property interest. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S., at 570-571, n.8.... To

put it as plainly as possible, the State may not finally destroy a property
interest without first giving the putative owner an opportunity to present [a]
1 27
claim of entitlement.
Any hearing must take place "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."'' 28 In some unusual circumstances due process does permit hearings to
take place after the deprivation, but
that does not mean, of course, that the state can take property without
providing a meaningful post-deprivation hearing. The prior cases which have
excused the prior-hearing requirement have rested in part on the availability
of some meaningful opportunity subsequent to the initial taking for a

125. Id.
126. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989) (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40
(1940)).
127. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433-4 (1982) (state dismissal of discrimination
claim filed timely, because the state agency in which it had been filed had not convened a fact-finding
congruence within the statutory time limit, procedural due process was violated) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
in original). See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971).
128. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (post-deprivation adversarial hearing in social security
disability case is sufficient to meet due process requirements); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
See also Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 261 (1987).
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determination of rights and liabilities.129
Under the Master Meter Act, no notice and no hearing in which the tenants can
participate is required before or after the deprivation. The receiver may take the
funds and distribute them as it sees fit or as a court permits. This may be done
without the participation of the tenants and without ever filing a nonpayment-ofrent suit or in any other way affording the tenants the opportunity to defend
against the receiver's implied claim that the funds are owed. Furthermore, filing a
nonpayment suit is disadvantageous to a receiver, because, if such a suit is filed,
the tenants can raise their warranty-of-habitability defenses. 21 0 If these defenses
are successful, the court will reduce the funds awarded to the receiver by abating
some r all of the rent. For this reason, a receiver is unlikely to opt for a
nonpayment suit.
Moreover, a hearing is unlikely to take place within a reasonable time if the
receiver does file suit. Sometimes months, even more than a year, may pass before
a landlord-tenant case comes to trial, especially if a jury trial is demanded. In
1736 18th Street,"'1 for example, the jury trial took place more than fifteen
months after the receivership order was signed, and there was never a hearing on
the merits of the receiver's claim to the funds. 2 Other tenants of the same
building were not sued for nonpayment of rent, but the court appointed a receiver
as trustee without a hearing on their claims.
While it is clear that some kind of hearing in which tenants can participate is
constitutionally required before or shortly after the receiver can deprive the
tenants of their money, the question remains as to the kind of hearing required.
The Supreme Court set out the following factors to be weighed in determining
what process is due:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures

129. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981) (prisoner's Section 1983 suit for state's loss of mailed
hobby equipment barred because no prior hearing would be feasible and adequate state remedies exist; thus no
constitutional deprivation), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
130. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
131. L&T No. 26204-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25. 1987). See discussion supra p. 123.
132. In that case, oral argument was heard on the receiver's request to release funds in the court
registry to it as trustee of the tenant's funds. The court rejected the motion and only reached or heard
testimony on the question of whether the tenants actually owed that money during the nonpayment jury trial
in March 1988. See id.
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used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.' 3 3
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has phrased the test as follows:
Determination of constitutionally required due process for a particular
situation is essentially a balancing test involving consideration of
governmental interests in efficiency and accurate determinations, private
concerns at stake in the case, the complexity of the issues, the nature of the
proceeding and its other safeguards, and an, assessment of the danger to
134
society from inaccurate determinations in each direction.
1. Tenant Participationin Judicial Hearings
Tenants have at least two primary interests in receivership proceedings. First,
they have an interest in living in homes that meet the requirements of the District
of Columbia housing code with respect to safety and sanitation. Second, they have
an interest in not paying money they do not owe.
Often the only leverage tenants have to force a landlord to correct housing code
violations is to withhold rent and seek an abatement when sued. 135 Accordingly,
they may withhold their rent to try to force their landlord to make repairs. If
unsuccessful in forcing repairs, the tenants might at least prevent the landlord
from profiting from the failure to repair housing code violations.
The existence of unsafe and unsanitary conditions is not unusual in receivership
cases. All too frequently, landlords that are not paying the utility bills are not
living up to their other responsibilities to maintain their buildings properly.
Recognizing this problem, the District of Columbia Council added Section 43-545
to the Master Meter Act,"16 which preserved tenants' remedies. The tenants'
interest in withholding rent to force repairs and vindicating that right before the
court, however, is defeated if the receiver fails to bring a nonpayment suit where
133. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See also Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481
U.S. 252, 262 (1987).
134. Sherman v. Commission on Licensure to Practice Healing Art, 407 A.2d 595, 600-01 (D.C. 1979).
See also In Re Richardson, 481 A.2d 473, 481-82 (D.C. 1984).
135. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079-80.
136. D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-545 (1981). See supra text accompanying note 18.
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tenants can raise these matters as defenses.
Tenants who withhold their rent have another interest in not giving the receiver
control over their money. That interest is to avoid paying for amounts they do not
owe. If the utility bill is less than the rent, the receiver will give the landlord the
balance. 137 Because the receiver can choose which, if any, tenant funds to
pursue,"3 8 one tenant could be burdened with the debt of an entire building. 30 A
burden on a single tenant could occur regardless of the number of tenants and
squatters using the building and its utilities. It is possible, therefore, that one or a
few tenants who have saved their money, in case they are sued for nonpayment of
rent, could be assessed far more utility costs than the tenant or group of tenants
owed for actual usage. Thus, the tenants' second interest in not paying money they
do not owe due to housing code violations on the premises or nonreceipt of services,
is defeated by the lack of a hearing under the Master Meter Act.
The receiver and the utility company have an interest in payment of the utility
bills; however, the utility company's right to have its bills paid by the tenants is
limited. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals found the receiver's right to
rent under the Act does not exceed that of the landlord."10 Accordingly, the
receiver would not be able to collect rent greater than that provided in a lease even
if the utility bill exceeded the rent. Likewise, the receiver cannot collect more rent
in a nonpayment suit than the court finds is owed after considering tenant
defenses. 1"
Moreover, tenants are not the only parties to whom the receiver can look for
payment of bills owed. The bills are the landlord's responsibility. A receiver is only
appointed when the landlord has not paid the bills. Thus, it is more equitable for
courts to require the receiver to look primarily to the landlord to collect the utility
bill rather than to require tenants to pay money that they do not owe. Routine
collection devices such as liens on buildings, civil judgments, and even sales of
buildings, could be used to collect the overdue bills from the landlord.
Finally, the utility company has one other option to make up for its lost revenue
if neither the landlord nor the tenants pay the bill.142 The District of Columbia

137.

Id. § 43-543(a)(4).

138.

Id.

139.
Aug. 25,
140.
141.
142.
payment,

See e.g. 1736 18th St. N.W. Ltd. Partnership v. Saleem, L&T No. 26204-86 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1987) (nonpayment suit brought against only three or six tenants living in a building).
Shannon & Luchs v. Jeter, 469 A.2d 812, 816 (D.C. 1983).
Id.
The total amount of uncollectibles, those bills for which the utility company cannot collect any
increased after the enactment of the Master Meter Act.
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Court of Appeals upheld the Public Service Commission's policy to consider
uncollectible accounts when determining a utility company's rates.1,48 As a result,
when a utility company raises its rates to recover its losses, the costs are spread
through the entire community of utility consumers.
The landlord's interest in the proceedings is to ensure that tenants pay their
entire rent. The landlord has no right to the entire rent, however, if the premises
do not satisfy the requirements of the housing code.1" '
Balancing the various private concerns at stake demonstrates the importance of
providing a prompt judicial hearing on the amount of rent owed, perhaps even
before a receiver is named trustee of tenant funds. The tenants' interests in
presenting their warranty-of-habitability defenses and not in paying money they do
not owe, would be protected by such a hearing, without affecting the landlord's
interest in receiving the actual rent due. The utility company's interest in having
its bill paid might be limited, but such a limitation comports with the legal
structure of tenants' rights.
2. Societal Interests in Proceedings
The societal interests in these proceedings are several. The public interest is
served by ensuring accurate judicial determinations, landlord compliance with the
D.C. housing code, payment of utility bills by those who owe them, and tenant
payment of rent. These interests are harmed when the Act is used to award tenant
funds to the receiver without a hearing.
As provided by the Act, tenant funds may potentially be seized without giving
tenants the opportunity to raise warranty-of-habitability defenses. In such cases,
the government's interest in ensuring accurate judicial determinations as well as
society's interest in having tenants pay only the rent that they owe are defeated.
Tenants' interests in withholding rent to encourage landlords to comply with the
housing code fully comport with society's interest in achieving that end. The
District of Columbia adopted the housing code to preserve and promote "[t]he
public health, safety, welfare and morals through the abatement of certain
conditions affecting residential buildings and areas. .... ,,145 The District of
Columbia found that the maintenance of unsafe and unsanitary conditions

143. Office of the People's Counsel v. Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia, 482 A.2d
404, 413-14 (D.C. 1984).
144. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
145. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14, § 100.2.
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constitutes a public nuisance, 4" which causes "specific, immediate, and irreparable
and continuing harm" to tenants.147
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals weighed the mandate of the Master
Meter Act against the warranty of habitability in Shannon & Luchs v. Jeter."15 In
that case, the court was asked to identify the proper parties in a nonpayment
proceeding brought during receivership. Because of its concern for the warranty of
habitability, the court required that a receiver suing tenants for nonpayment of
rent must join the landlord to enable the tenants to raise their Javins defenses.240
Because the receiver has no incentive to bring a nonpayment suit if it can recover
and distribute the outstanding rent pursuant to Section 43-543(a)(4),100 and the
landlord can also recover at least some of the rent, the District of Columbia's
interest in landlord compliance with its housing code is diminished.
3.

Prompt JudicialHearings Insure Against Erroneous Decisions

The Master Meter Act provides no safeguards to tenants against wrongful
seizure of their money.' 5 ' Furthermore, in some cases, it may not be feasible to
seek repayment from the landlord, because the landlord may be bankrupt or on the
verge of bankruptcy. 52 In such cases, the tenants would be unable to obtain a
refund of any money wrongfully taken. In addition, there is no procedure provided
by the statute to determine whether the money is wrongfully taken.
A requirement that a hearing be provided for the tenants before or promptly
after the receiver is appointed trustee over the tenants' funds would not burden
judicial economy or efficiency.153 Because the challenged section of the Master
Meter Act neither provides such a prompt hearing, nor meets procedural due
process standards when the factors set out by the District of Columbia Court of

146. Id. § i01.1.
147. Id. § 101.3.
148. 469 A.2d 812, 817 (D.C. 1983).
149. Id.
150. D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-543(a)(4) (1981).
151. Neither the utility company nor the receiver places a bond in the event that tenants have no debt.
In one case, the receiver and landlord claimed that they would not be responsible to the tenants to repay any
money wrongly seized. Transcript of hearing, 1736 18th Street. N.W., L&T No. 26204-86 (D.C. Supcr. Ct.
February 25, 1987) at 8-9.
152. See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Company v. 1736 18th Street N.W. Ltd. Partnership, L&T No.
9919-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1987); Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
153. Procedures that could be added to the Act by amendment and could cure the statute of its
constitutional problems are discussed infra Section IV.
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Appeals are weighed,"' Section 43-543(a)(4) of the Act is unconstitutional.
IV. AMENDMENT OF THE MASTER METER ACT To PASS CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER

The Act as a whole, however, is not unconstitutional because the provision
allowing the appointment of the receiver is not central to the statute. 10 The
District of Columbia Council, therefore, should amend the statute to remove the
offending provision or create procedural safeguards to protect tenant due process
rights. Such an amendment would not fundamentally change the law. To
understand the ease with which the D.C. Council could remedy the Act by
removing Section 43-543(a)(4), it is useful to consider the importance the D.C.
Council originally gave to the provision. Examination of the Council's intent will
help to answer "the crucial inquiry whether [a legislature] would have enacted
other portions of the statute in the absence of the invalidated provision." 1 0
The legislative history of the Master Meter Act is totally silent concerning
Section 43-543(a)(4). The Roundtable discussion of that section does not mention
the receiver's ability to become the trustee of tenant funds. 0 7 Had the challenged
portion of Section 43-543(a)(4) been important to the Council's decision to pass
the law, the body would presumably have discussed the provisions and explained
them.
To conform with Supreme Court precedent on legislative severability, the
provision in question should only be changed or eliminated if the Act can function
meaningfully without it. 158 The Master Meter Act is fully functional without the

154. See Sherman v. Commission on Licensure to Practice Healing Art, 407 A.2d 595, 600-601 (D.C.
1979).
155. See, e.g., Hartford Elec. Light Co. v. Tucker, 401 A.2d 454 (Conn. 1978) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Connecticut statute, after which the D.C. Master Meter Act was modeled, against the
claim of a utility company that the Connecticut statute permitted a taking without due process).
156. Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 442, (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd sub
nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968). See also, EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188,
1192 (5th Cir. 1984).
157. Roundtable supra note 1, at 12-13.
158. The Supreme Court emphasized this requirement in answering the question of severability as
applied to the Federal Kidnapping Act: "The clause in question is a functionally independent part of the
Federal Kidnapping Act. Its elimination in no way alters the substantive reach of the statute and leaves
completely unchanged its basic operation." United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 586 (1968). See also INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 934 (1983).
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trustee provision. 59 When tenants do not pay their rent, a utility company can still
collect its bills through the appointment of a receiver to collect rent and sue
tenants, with the landlord as a party. 160
Another indication of the viability of the Master Meter Act without the trustee
provision is that the Connecticut law 161 on which the Act was based contains no
such provision. That statute has nevertheless survived constitutional challenges and
remains in effect in that state without the provision challenged here.102 The D.C.
Council could, therefore, remove that provision of the Master Meter Act that
enables a receiver to become the trustee of tenant funds.
The Council may be reluctant to remove the provision because of concern that
the funds tenants may have saved should be available to the receiver and,
ultimately, the utility company, if those funds are actually owed by the tenants.
That concern could be met by amending the law to provide the procedural due
process protections that the Fifth Amendment requires.10 3 The Council could
easily do so by requiring a court to hold a hearing before or immediately after
allowing the receiver to become the trustee of tenant funds.
The procedure would not be overly cumbersome, because the issues before the
court would not be complex. A court would merely be required to make an interim
determination as to the amount of abatement that is likely to be awarded after a
trial for nonpayment of rent. The law should require that the tenants be made
parties to the proceeding before a hearing takes place and that they be served with
notice that adequately informs them of their rights and of the proceeding.'"
The judges of the D.C. Superior Court routinely hold preliminary hearings to
determine how much rent is likely to be owed when tenants file motions to reduce
their protective orders, or when they challenge the amount of a protective order. 0 5
Once a hearing is held, the receiver is permitted to collect the funds the tenants
are found to owe and disburse them to the utility company. If the tenants have

D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-543(a)(4) (1981).
160. See generally id. §§ 43-541, 43-542, 43-543(a)(I)-(3).
161. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 16-262(c) to -262(i) (1988).
162. Id. See also Hartford Elec. Light Co. v. Tucker. 401 A.2d 454 (Conn. 1978): Yankee Gas Serv.
Co. v. DaSilva, 587 A.2d 341 (Conn. 1991) cert. denied, 593 A.2d 158 (Conn. 1991).
163. See supra Section III.
164. See also Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-19 (1978) (utility company
required to give notice to customer of procedural rights before termination of service); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989).
165. Haynes v. Logan, 600 A.2d 1074, 1075 (1991); City Wide Learning Center Inc. v. William C.
Smith & Co., Inc., 488 A.2d 1310, 1314 (D.C. 1985). See also McNeal v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508, 514 (D.C.
1975).
159.
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saved more money than the amount likely owed to the utility company, the
receiver should retain the additional sum until the nonpayment proceeding is
completed rather than turn it over to the landlord, as the current wording of the
Act permits.
The order must, nonetheless, be provisional if it is to be constitutionally sound.
The tenants have a constitutional right to a jury determination of how much rent
they owe.' 66 Thus, the receiver, if named the trustee of tenant funds, should be
required to bring a nonpayment suit as soon as possible and to post a bond for the
money it receives. The suit would serve the tenants' interest in having a trial.
At the conclusion of the nonpayment proceeding, a judge or jury would
determine how much rent the tenants actually owe. If the receiver retained any of
the tenants' money over which it gained control because the amount exceeded the
utility costs owed, it should pay those funds to the landlord or the tenants
according to the court's determination. The utility company should be liable to the
tenants and be required to return to them any additional overpayment exacted
pursuant to this procedure. The company could make that payment through
release of the bond by the receiver upon being named trustee. In that way, the
tenants would be protected from a wrongful deprivation. To ensure that the funds
are available for any repayments necessary under these provisions, the receiver and
the utility company should be required to put up a bond with the court before they
167
provisionally take any of the tenants' funds.
This procedure would provide tenants with the due process required by the Fifth
Amendment. Unfortunately, these procedures are neither part of the current Act,
nor can they reasonably be read into it.
V. CONCLUSION

In spite of its-overall effectiveness in resolving a problem which tenants had
faced, the Master Meter Act is flawed by a provision which permits the receiver to
become the trustee of tenant funds. This provision violates the tenants' due process
rights and is therefore unconstitutional. The Act should be amended to eliminate
the provision entirely or to provide the procedural safeguards which the
Constitution mandates.
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